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ALLEN V. COOPER: RAISING THE FLAG OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY IN THE SHIFTING SEAS OF COPYRIGHT  
WILL R. GALLAGHER* 
 
The expansion of maritime trade in the mid-1600s sparked the “Golden 
Age of Piracy,” when fearless privateers plundered the high seas for fame 
and fortune.1  One of the most infamous pirates of this era, Blackbeard, left 
plenty of both for the history books.2  As traditional piracy has faded from 
our shores, digital piracy has largely taken its place.  But no pirate legend or 
sea shanty could have foretold that Blackbeard’s ship would one day be at 
the center of a stunning decision that condones modern piracy of citizens’ 
copyrights, as long as the infringement is committed by a state.  
In Allen v. Cooper,3 the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (“CRCA”) validly 
abrogated state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits.4  
Relying on a convoluted interpretation of the state sovereign immunity 
doctrine, the Court held that neither Article I nor the Fourteenth Amendment 
could anchor the law.5  In the Court’s view, the CRCA lacked “congruence 
and proportionality” between its intended remedy and the perceived record 
of state misconduct.6  The decision completely bars infringement remedies 
for copyright owners whose works have been commandeered by a state, 
leaving them stranded without recourse until Congress can soon muster up a 
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 1. Stephen Barnett, Monsters of Their Own Making: Understanding the Context of the Rise of 
the “Golden Age of Piracy,” 5 LOGOS, Fall 2012, at 19. 
 2. Id. at 20 (recounting the lore surrounding Blackbeard and depicting his formidable 
appearance as “a complete fury; with three brace pistols in holsters, slung over his shoulders like 
bandoliers, and lighted matches under his hat sticking out over each of his ears”).  
 3. 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). 
 4. Id. at 1000.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1007; see infra Sections IV.B–C.  
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more narrowly tailored statute.7  Regardless of the historical record or degree 
of intent, allowing states to skirt liability for copyright infringement subverts 
the fundamental goals of the copyright system to promote and protect artistic 
expression.8   
I. THE CASE   
In 1717, the legendary pirate Blackbeard captured a French frigate, 
made it his flagship, and renamed it Queen Anne’s Revenge.9  Shortly 
thereafter, his new prize ran aground one mile off the coast of North 
Carolina.10  Blackbeard and his crew escaped unharmed, and the wreckage 
lay beneath the sea for hundreds of years until 1996, when it was discovered 
by the maritime exploration firm Intersal.11  Due to its proximity to shore, 
North Carolina legally owned the wreck and its booty.12  The State contracted 
with Intersal to supervise the excavation.13  Intersal then hired aquatic 
videography company Nautilus Productions, headed by Rick Allen, to 
document the process.14  The agreement provided that Allen would finance 
the project and in return own copyrights in all of the resulting audiovisual 
works.15 
In 2013, the State began posting some of Allen’s images to its website 
without permission, and the parties negotiated a settlement whereby the State 
agreed to pay him $15,000 for its wrongdoing.16  Notwithstanding the 
settlement, the State then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which explicitly 
placed media depicting any “derelict vessel or shipwreck” into the public 
domain, effectively eliminating Allen’s copyright protections.17  After 
discovering further infringement, Allen promptly filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.18  The State 
countered by raising a sovereign immunity defense, but the district court 
 
 7. See infra Section IV.C. 
 8. See infra Section IV.D.  
 9. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.; 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 121–22 (West 2019).  Thousands of 
artifacts have been recovered and restored, including twenty-four cannons.  See Discovery of the 
Shipwreck, QUEEN ANNE’S REVENGE PROJECT, https://www.qaronline.org/history/discovery-
shipwreck [https://perma.cc/9WS5-HZKZ]. 
 13. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999.   
 14. Id.   
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 121–25(b) (West 2016).   
 18. Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525 (E.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).  
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agreed with Allen that the CRCA had validly abrogated sovereign immunity 
from copyright infringement suits pursuant to Congress’s authority to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.19  The State appealed, and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.20  Following the Fourth 
Circuit’s reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
the CRCA had a valid constitutional basis in either Article I or the Fourteenth 
Amendment.21 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity generally prohibits citizens 
from filing suit against a nonconsenting state.22  It is rooted in the English 
common law principle that members of the ruling class could not be tried 
without their consent because their authority was unquestionable.23  The 
Eleventh Amendment reinforces the state sovereign immunity doctrine by 
revoking federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear suits brought by out-of-state 
plaintiffs against a state.24  Over time, a meandering and divided Supreme 
Court has greatly expanded the scope of the state sovereign immunity 
doctrine, divorcing it from the plain text of the Amendment.25   
Under the Court’s jurisprudence, there are two mechanisms by which 
state sovereign immunity can be overcome.  First, the state itself can waive 
immunity by enacting a waiver statute.26  Second, immunity can be abrogated 
by an act of Congress.27  Although the Court has always maintained the 
viability of both of these mechanisms, it has adopted increasingly restrictive 
standards in recent cases that make both of these avenues more difficult to 
 
 19. Id. at 535 (“Congress was clearly responding to a pattern of current and anticipated abuse 
by the states of the copyrights held by their citizens.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).  
 20. Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018).  
 21. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020).  
 22. Id.  
 23. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 460 (1793) (“In England . . . no suit can be brought 
against the King, even in civil matters.”).  
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).  
 25. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“Despite the 
narrowness of its terms . . . we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for 
what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms . . . .”).  
 26. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (“[I]f a State waives its 
immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action.”). 
 27. Id. at 242–43.  
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navigate.28  Implied or abstract language, whether in a state-initiated waiver 
of sovereign immunity or a congressional abrogation statute, no longer 
suffices.29  Both waivers and abrogation statutes must clearly and 
“unequivocal[ly]” invoke abrogation to be valid.30   
Abrogation statutes must also be supported by a valid constitutional 
basis.31  Historically, statutes like the CRCA have anchored their abrogatory 
authority upon Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment.32  In the past two 
decades, however, the Court has whittled the viable constitutional 
foundations down to a single provision: Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.33   
Section II.A outlines the murky history of the state sovereign immunity 
doctrine and traces its modern developments.34  Section II.B reviews the 
doctrine’s application to statutes passed pursuant to Article I powers.35  
Section II.C explains how the Court has shifted from a policy of deference to 
Congress to one of zealous oversight by restricting abrogations to those that 
are narrowly tailored to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.36    
A. State Sovereign Immunity in United States Law  
State sovereign immunity is a key check on federal power that derives 
from the unquestionable political authority of English feudal royalty.37  As it 
was not discernible in the text of the Constitution, the Framers disagreed 
about whether state sovereign immunity was embodied therein by some other 
means.38  Anti-federalists worried that the Constitution would permit suits 
brought by citizens against states in federal court, which they sought to 
 
 28. Id. at 238–40; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (abrogation 
statutes must be tailored to “remedy or prevent” state conduct that violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 29. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (“[E]vidence of congressional intent must be 
both unequivocal and textual.”). 
 30. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 239–40.  
 31. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (abrogation statutes must be enacted “pursuant 
to a valid exercise of power”). 
 32. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635–
36 (1999) (“Congress justified the Patent Remedy Act under three sources of constitutional 
authority: the Patent Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; and 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 33. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
 34. See infra Section II.A.  
 35. See infra Section II.B.   
 36. See infra Section II.C. 
 37. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1890). 
 38. Id. at 12–15.  
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prevent.39  This construction, however, was widely rebuffed by anti-
federalists and federalists alike, who maintained that states would be 
immune.40  When the Supreme Court in 1793 permitted a diversity suit 
against a state in federal court in Chisholm v. Georgia,41 Congress swiftly 
moved to overturn this widely disfavored ruling by enacting the Eleventh 
Amendment.42  The text of the Amendment only specifically barred diversity 
suits, however, and left unclear the status of in-state and federal question 
suits.43   
The open question of how the Eleventh Amendment would treat in-state 
plaintiffs was addressed in Hans v. Louisiana,44 wherein the Supreme Court 
upheld Louisiana’s sovereign immunity defense from a suit brought by the 
State’s own citizen.45  By distancing the doctrine from the constitutional text, 
the Court—newly appreciative of sovereign immunity—set in motion a new 
and more expansive interpretation of the doctrine that continues to drive 
modern sovereign immunity jurisprudence.46  Nevertheless, members of the 
Court have fervently and increasingly disagreed about whether to adopt a 
broad interpretation that prevents most suits against states, as the Court had 
in Hans, or a narrow one that more closely tracks the language of the Eleventh 
Amendment.47   
 
 39. Id. at 14.  Article III empowers the federal judiciary to hear cases “between a State and 
citizens of another State.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  A literal interpretation of the neutral word 
“between” suggests that federal jurisdiction would exist regardless of whether the state is a plaintiff 
or a defendant.  See Between, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (online ed., 2021), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/between (“by the common action of; jointly engaging; . . . in common to; 
shared by”).  
 40. Hans, 134 U.S. at 13–14; THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (George 
Sade ed., 2006) (“Unless . . . there is a surrender of [sovereign] immunity in the plan of the 
convention, it will remain with the States.”).  
 41. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).  
 42. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11 (“This amendment . . . actually reversed the decision of the Supreme 
Court.”).  Interestingly, the Eleventh Amendment does not change the language of the Constitution 
but rather tells us how to interpret it, or, more accurately, how not to interpret it.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity . . . .”) (emphasis added).   
 43. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020). 
 44. 134 U.S. 1. 
 45. Id. at 15.   
 46. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
 47. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There 
is first the correct and literal interpretation of the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment . . . . In 
addition, there is the defense of sovereign immunity that the Court has added to the text of the 
Amendment . . . .”), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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B. Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Under Article I  
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress several 
enumerated powers, including the power to foster scientific and artistic 
innovation by “securing . . . exclusive” rights to patent and copyright 
owners.48  These grants of federal authority necessarily limit state power.49  
But after handing down a series of inconsistent decisions in recent decades, 
a narrow majority of the Court has essentially abandoned Article I as a source 
of abrogatory power by separating state sovereign immunity from the federal-
state power calculus entirely and concluding that immunity cannot be 
constrained even by ostensibly plenary Article I powers.50   
In an early waiver case, Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks 
Dep’t,51 the Court rejected a state’s sovereign immunity defense in a suit 
brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act, finding that the state had 
impliedly waived its immunity when it ratified the Commerce Clause and 
subsequently engaged in interstate business.52  The Court found that the Act’s 
language, which held “every common carrier” liable to suits brought by 
passengers who suffered injuries, included state-owned railroad agencies.53  
Put simply: If Congress speaks broadly about a right to sue without expressly 
indicating that states are immune, then state and private actors are liable to 
 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[Congress shall have power to] promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).  Commonly referred to as the Intellectual 
Property Clause, this language forms the foundation of both patent and copyright law.  See generally 
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background 
and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 1 (1995).  
 49. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 16 (1989) (“[T]he Commerce Clause with one hand gives power 
to Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States.”), overruled by Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
 50. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (“Even when the Constitution 
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment 
prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”). 
 51. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).  
 52. Id. at 191 (stating states had “surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted 
Congress the power to regulate commerce”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall 
have power to] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes . . . .”).  Although the Parden Court framed the statutory language as providing a 
“waiver” of immunity, the case is more aptly characterized as an abrogation rather than a waiver, 
since a waiver would not require any constitutional grounding.  See Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). 
 53. Parden, 377 U.S. at 185–88 (“We think that Congress, in making the FELA applicable to 
“every” common carrier . . . meant what it said.  That congressional statutes regulating railroads in 
interstate commerce apply to such railroads whether they are state owned or privately owned is 
hardly a novel proposition; it has twice been clearly affirmed by this Court.”).  
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the same extent.54  Two decades later, the Court in Atascadero State Hospital 
v. Scanlon55 departed from this precedent and limited the validity of waiver 
and abrogation provisions to cases where the state’s intent to waive or 
Congress’s intent to abrogate was unmistakably clear.56 
Continuing to fluctuate in its interpretation of the sovereign immunity 
doctrine, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.57 once again rejected a 
state’s sovereign immunity defense, this time regarding a federal waste 
management law that Congress had passed pursuant to Article I.58  The Court 
found Congress’s intent to abrogate sufficiently clear.59  The Court then 
reasoned that by ratifying the Constitution, the states had broadly consented 
to liability for transgressing Congress’s Article I authority in situations where 
Congress found it appropriate to hold them liable.60  Without the ability to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Court believed that Congress’s 
exercise of its Article I powers would be unduly constrained.61   
Seven years later, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,62 the Court 
completely reversed course and held that Article I could no longer provide a 
valid basis for abrogating state sovereign immunity.63  The contested law in 
that case, which was passed pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause,64 
directed states to negotiate with Native American tribes regarding the 
formation of casinos on tribal land.65  The law specifically authorized federal 
courts to hear suits brought by tribes against states that failed to negotiate in 
good faith.66  The Court quickly found that the statutory language 
demonstrated an “unmistakably clear” intent to abrogate sovereign 
immunity.67  The principal question thus became whether the abrogation 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
 56. Id. at 239–40 (“[A] State will be deemed to have waived its immunity ‘only where stated 
“by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave 
no room for any other reasonable construction.”‘“).  
 57. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
 58. Id. at 23.   
 59. Id. at 8.  
 60. Id. at 19–20 (“[T]o the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate 
commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising 
this authority, to render them liable.”).  
 61. Id. at 19 (“[T]he congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete without the 
authority to render States liable in damages . . . .”).  
 62. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).   
 63. Id. at 72–73.  
 64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have power to] regulate Commerce . . .  with 
the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 65. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
 66. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A).  
 67. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56. 
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rested on a valid constitutional basis.68  The Court began this inquiry by 
comparing the Indian Commerce Clause to the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.69 As noted above, the Court had recently championed the Interstate 
Commerce Clause as a valid basis for abrogation in Union Gas.70  The 
Seminole Tribe Court found that the Indian Commerce Clause vested even 
greater power in the federal government than the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, nearly completely preempting any corresponding state regulatory 
authority.71  Nevertheless, the Court overturned Union Gas, holding that 
Article I could not encroach upon state sovereign immunity.72  The Court 
attacked the precedential value of Union Gas on the grounds that there was 
no majority opinion and that the conflicting rationales invited confusion.73   
To overcome the barrier of stare decisis, the Court assumed an 
affirmative duty to overrule erroneous decisions, reiterating that it “has never 
felt constrained to follow precedent” when correcting past errors.74  
Moreover, because the petitioners did not argue that the Act was passed 
pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment powers, the Court declined to analyze 
whether the Act may be justified under the Fourteenth Amendment.75  
Seminole Tribe signifies a turning point in the majority’s interpretation of 
state sovereign immunity wherein it now extends to areas where state laws 
are preempted and federal authority is exclusive, like Indian commerce, 
immigration, and intellectual property.76  This newfound discord with 
preemption doctrine is unusual because it empowers states to elude legal 
accountability in areas of vital importance to the federal government under 
the theory that Article I simply cannot expand the constitutionally prescribed 
boundaries of federal court jurisdiction set forth in Article III.77   
 
 68. Id. at 59 (“[O]ur inquiry . . . is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question 
passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate?”).  
 69. Id. at 60–61.  
 70. Id. at 60.  
 71. Id. at 62.  
 72. Id. at 73.  
 73. Id. at 64.  
 74. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).  
 75. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 60 (“[P]etitioner does not challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s 
conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.”). 
 76. Id. at 72–73.  The preemption doctrine prevents states from enacting laws that undermine 
federal law or regulate—even harmoniously—in certain areas that have been comprehensively 
legislated by Congress.  See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“Where Congress 
occupies an entire field . . . even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”).  
 77. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (“[The conclusion] that Congress could under Article I 
expand the scope of federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III . . . ‘contradicted our unvarying 
approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal-court 
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Yet in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,78 a 2006 
bankruptcy case, the Supreme Court backpedaled on its sweeping holding 
from Seminole Tribe.79  The Katz Court held that the Article I Bankruptcy 
Clause did empower Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity from 
bankruptcy suits.80  The Court distinguished bankruptcy from other Article I 
powers by focusing on the Framers’ intent to enable the federal government 
to restrain the states’ “wildly divergent” bankruptcy laws.81  Quite 
remarkably, the Court found that no further action was needed by Congress 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity from bankruptcy suits—the abrogation 
had already been effectuated by ratification.82  The erosion of Congress’s 
authority to abrogate under Article I leaves copyright holders whose works 
have been infringed by a state with a single leg to stand on: the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
C. Abrogation Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment famously asserts that no state shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”83  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to 
“enforce” these protections through “appropriate legislation.”84  In so doing, 
the Amendment “fundamentally alter[s] the balance of state and federal 
power” by permitting Congress to redress state abuse.85  Although the 
Supreme Court has always recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment can 
provide a basis for abrogating state sovereign immunity, in recent years it has 
greatly limited the extent of permissible congressional action by developing 
a new test86 and subsequently applying that test as a means to strike down 
abrogation in the patent infringement context.87 
 
jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)), overruled by Seminole 
Tribe, 517 U.S. 44. 
 78. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).  
 79. Id. at 363 (“[The] assumption that the holding in [Seminole Tribe] would apply to the 
Bankruptcy Clause . . . was erroneous.”).  
 80. Id. at 359; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“[Congress shall have power to] enact 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”). 
 81. Katz, 546 U.S. at 365.  
 82. Id. at 379 (“[T]he relevant ‘abrogation’ is the one effected in the plan of the [Constitutional] 
Convention . . .”).  This finding contradicts the Court’s typical rule that Congress must enact a clear 
abrogation provision relying on a valid constitutional provision.  Id.  
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 84. Id. § 5.   
 85. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). 
 86. See infra Section II.C.1.  
 87. See infra Section II.C.2. 
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1. A New Test for Abrogation Under Boerne  
In City of Boerne v. Flores,88 the Supreme Court held that there must be 
“congruence and proportionality” between the injury to be corrected and 
Congress’s remedy.89  In other words, the scope of the abrogation must be 
proportional to the severity of state misconduct.90  The Boerne test requires 
that the abrogatory legislation be narrowly tailored to address state conduct 
that actually violates the Due Process Clause in order to be considered 
“appropriate” by the Court.91  The test compels an examination into the 
“nature and extent” of state conduct that allegedly violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is often evidenced by the 
legislative record.92   
A critical feature of the Boerne test is that the scope of permissible 
abrogatory authority can only be assessed by the Court, as Congress may not 
substantively redefine Fourteenth Amendment protections.93  While 
Congress can enact both remedial and prophylactic measures—a seemingly 
expansive scope—Boerne made clear that abrogation legislation must be in 
accordance with the Court’s view of the problems at hand.94  Because 
Congress lacks the authority to determine whether a particular state act 
violates the Due Process Clause, it must distinguish unconstitutional and 
constitutional state acts based on existing case law in order to succeed.95  
2. Abrogation in the Intellectual Property Context Under Florida 
Prepaid 
 The first Copyright Act, passed in 1790 (just five years before the 
Eleventh Amendment), defined an infringer broadly as anyone who violated 
 
 88. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 89. Id. at 520.  The challenged law in Boerne was the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb–4.  
 90. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
 91. Id. at 530; see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (“[T]he deprivation by 
state action of a constitutionally protected interest . . . is not in itself unconstitutional; what is 
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.”). 
 92. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020).  
 93. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-
remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”). 
 94. Id. at 519.  According to the Court, abrogation statutes are permitted to redress some state 
conduct that does not inherently raise constitutional concerns.  Id. at 518 (Congress may enact 
remedial legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment “even if in the process it prohibits conduct 
which is not itself unconstitutional”). 
 95. Id. at 519 (“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right 
is.”); see also Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (“[A] congressional abrogation is valid under Section 5 only 
if it sufficiently connects to conduct courts have held Section 1 to proscribe.”). 
  
2021] ALLEN V. COOPER 1231 
 
any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner.96   For over 150 years, no 
court accepted a state’s sovereign immunity defense in a copyright 
infringement suit.97  But after the Supreme Court began to demand 
unequivocal abrogatory language, circuit courts followed suit and started to 
reject the abrogatory clarity of the Copyright Act to the immense frustration 
of aggrieved copyright owners.98  To address this concern, Congress tasked 
Ralph Oman, the Register of Copyrights, with gauging the scope of harms 
caused by state infringement.99  The Oman Report identified several clear 
instances of intentional infringement and warned of “dire financial and other 
repercussions that would flow” from state immunity.100   
Armed with this information, the CRCA amended the language of the 
copyright infringement statute to make Congress’s intent to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity unmistakably clear.101  The updated law clarified that 
states “shall be subject to the provisions of [copyright law] in the same 
manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.”102  The new 
language also specified that states shall not be immune from copyright 
infringement suits “under the Eleventh Amendment” or “any other doctrine 
of sovereign immunity.”103  The Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act (“PRCA”) then expanded the scope of the abrogation to 
 
 96. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).  These include the right to reproduce, perform, 
and distribute the work, as well as create derivative works.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 97. Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 12 (2002) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights, United States Copyright Office) [hereinafter “Marybeth Statement”].  For example, 
relying on Parden, the Ninth Circuit found the 1790 act’s language sufficient to abrogate state 
immunity.  Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 98. Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 117–18 (4th Cir. 1988); Lane v. 
First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 168–69 (1st Cir. 1989); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 
334 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he general term ‘whoever’ is not the requisite unmistakable language of 
congressional intent necessary to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). 
 99. The Register of Copyrights is the title given to the director of the U.S. Copyright Office.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 701.  
 100. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, Copyright Liability of States and the 
Eleventh Amendment iii (1988) [hereinafter “Oman Report”], available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyright-liability-of-states-1988.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YF3-
572N]. 
 101. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (“Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee 
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, 
under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or 
nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner . . . .”). 
 102. Id. § 501(a).   
 103. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a).  The disclaimer of immunity under “any” doctrine tacitly recognizes 
the Court’s recent divorcing of the doctrine from its textual roots.  See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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patent infringement suits two years later.104  Utilizing nearly identical 
language, the two acts plainly foreclose the use of sovereign immunity as a 
defense in infringement cases and make states liable in the same manner as 
citizens.105   
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank,106 the Supreme Court struck down the PRCA, the sister statute 
to the CRCA, as an overreach of congressional authority.107  The Court 
agreed that the language of the PRCA clearly invoked abrogation, but after 
Seminole Tribe, Congress’s abrogatory authority could only reside within the 
Fourteenth Amendment.108  While courts have generally recognized 
intellectual property as a form of property protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,109 the Florida Prepaid Court maintained that merely negligent 
state conduct cannot “‘deprive’ [a] person of property within the meaning of 
the Due Process Clause.”110  Despite the fact that intent is not an element of 
copyright infringement, the Court chided Congress for not distinguishing its 
evidence of state infringement on the basis of intent.111  State infringement, 
per this novel construction, is unconstitutional only if it is intentional or if the 
state subsequently fails to offer an adequate remedy.112  Because state 
infringement is not inherently unconstitutional, abrogation statutes must be 
narrowly tailored to remedy the subset of infringements that are.113   
After reviewing the testimony regarding state infringement contained in 
the United States Senate and House reports, the Court concluded that the 
evidence “suggested that most state infringement was innocent or at worst 
 
 104. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a).  
 105. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 511(a).   
 106. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 107. Id. at 647 (holding that the PRCA was not appropriately tailored to correcting 
unconstitutional state patent infringement).  
 108. Id. at 648 (“Article I . . . does not give Congress the power to enact such legislation after 
Seminole Tribe.”). 
 109. See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 197 (1857) (“For, by the laws of the United States, 
the rights of a party under a patent are his private property . . . .”); see also Consolidated Fruit-Jar 
Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for 
land.”).  But see Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1008 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“I believe the question whether copyrights are property within the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause remains open.”).  
 110. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645. 
 111. Id. at 643 (“Congress, however, barely considered the availability of state remedies for 
patent infringement and hence whether the States’ conduct might have amounted to a constitutional 
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 639 (“[Congress] must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such 
conduct.”).  
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negligent.”114  In the Court’s view, the limited record of actual due process 
violations did not justify the sweeping remedy prescribed by the PRCA.115  
The Court listed several limitations Congress might have considered in order 
to tailor the Act to more precisely address due process violations, such as 
“limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement” (i.e., intentional or 
knowing infringement) or “only against [s]tates with questionable remedies 
or a high incidence of infringement.”116  With the Florida Prepaid precedent 
looming large, the Court next turned from patent to copyright infringement 
in Allen.  
III. THE COURT’S REASONING  
In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court addressed whether the CRCA 
was a valid exercise of congressional power.117  The Court unanimously held 
that Congress lacked the authority to enact the CRCA under either its Article 
I or Fourteenth Amendment powers.118  After reviewing the enigmatic history 
of the state sovereign immunity doctrine, the Court reiterated its two 
requirements for permitting a federal court to hear a suit against a 
nonconsenting state: (1) a clearly defined abrogation statute with (2) a valid 
constitutional basis.119  The Court agreed that the CRCA contained 
unequivocal language, but ruled that Congress lacked the authority to enact 
it.120   
Under a strict reading of Seminole Tribe, Article I can no longer provide 
a basis for abrogation.121  The Court rejected Allen’s argument that the Katz 
exception invited “a clause-by-clause approach” to analyzing the validity of 
an abrogation statute supported by Article I.122  The Court justified this 
exception by distinguishing bankruptcy suits in several ways.123   
 
 114. Id. at 645. 
 115. Id. at 645–47.  But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) (finding that 
deficiencies in the legislative record should not sway judicial decision-making).  
 116. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647. 
 117. 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020). 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 1000–01.  
 120. Id. at 1001 (“No one here disputes that Congress used clear enough language to abrogate 
the States’ immunity from copyright infringement suits.”).  
 121. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (“Article I cannot be used to 
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”). 
 122. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002-03.  See id. at 1003 (“Our decision, in short, viewed bankruptcy 
as on a different plane, governed by principles all its own.”). 
 123. Id.  First, the Court reasoned that bankruptcy proceedings do not offend state sovereignty 
to the same extent as copyright infringement proceedings due to their in rem nature.  Id. at 1002.  In 
rem proceedings are prosecuted against real property and assets, not people.  Id.  Second, the Court 
looked to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Clause, arguing that the Framers intended the 
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Having foreclosed Article I, the Court next turned to Allen’s Fourteenth 
Amendment argument.124  Finding the case analogous to Florida Prepaid, the 
Court explained that the CRCA could not be upheld without overturning that 
case because the PRCA and CRCA are functionally identical.125  Expressing 
a robust appreciation of stare decisis, the Court maintained that precedent 
should not be overturned without a “special justification” amounting to more 
than the belief “that the precedent was wrongly decided.”126  
The Court agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity, but only if the abrogation statute passes 
the “congruence and proportionality” test established in Boerne.127  Doubling 
down on Florida Prepaid, the Court maintained that copyright infringement, 
like patent infringement, violates the Due Process Clause only when it is 
intentional or when the state fails to offer an adequate remedy.128  The bulk 
of the Court’s analysis analogized the legislative records of the PRCA and 
CRCA and the evidence of state abuse contained therein.129  The Court was 
unpersuaded of the existence of a widespread infringement problem.130  In 
light of the expansive scope of the CRCA, which made states liable in all 
cases of infringement, the Court concluded that the documented evidence of 
actual due process violations and the sweeping remedy were 
disproportionate.131  Offering an olive branch to Allen and other aggrieved 
copyright holders, the Court speculated that Congress could enact an 
acceptable intellectual property abrogation statute in the future, as long as it 
is responsive to the Boerne test.132   
 
federal government to play a “leading role” in establishing nationally uniform policies for 
discharging debt.  Id.  Third, and perhaps most strikingly, the Court found that the language and 
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Clause were together sufficient to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity without any action from Congress.  Id. at 1003 (“Relying on the above account of the 
Framers’ intentions, the Court found that the Bankruptcy Clause itself did the abrogating.”) 
(emphasis in original).  
 124. Id.   
 125. Id. (“[T]here is no difference between copyrights and patents under the Clause, nor any 
material difference between the two statutes’ provisions.”).  
 126. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014) (citing Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 127. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
 128. Id. (“Under our precedent, a merely negligent act does not ‘deprive’ a person of property.”); 
see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (conduct must be intentional or reckless to 
violate the Due Process Clause).  
 129. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1007 (“Florida Prepaid all but prewrote our decision today.”).  
 130. Id. at 1006 (“[N]othing in the Oman Report, or the rest of the legislative record, cures the 
problems we identified in Florida Prepaid.”).  
 131. Id. at 1007 (“Under Florida Prepaid, the CRCA thus must fail our ‘congruence and 
proportionality’ test.”) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).  
 132. Id. (“That conclusion, however, need not prevent Congress from passing a valid copyright 
abrogation law in the future.”).  It is important to note that Seminole Tribe and Boerne were both 
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Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concurring opinion, 
arguing that both Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment could support the 
abrogation.133  Although both Justices Breyer and Ginsburg had dissented in 
Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid and indicated their discomfort with the 
majority’s current interpretation of the doctrine, they concurred because they 
considered those cases to be binding precedent.134 
Justice Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion addressing three 
concerns.135  First, he spurned the Court’s approach to stare decisis as 
needing a special justification beyond mere error to overrule a decision.136  
Second, he voiced his opposition to advising Congress on crafting 
hypothetical pieces of legislation.137  Third, he questioned whether copyrights 
are encompassed within the original meaning of “property” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.138 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court struck down the CRCA, holding 
that Congress could not broadly abrogate state sovereign immunity from 
copyright infringement lawsuits.139  As a result, states can now infringe with 
impunity, subverting the goals of copyright law and leaving copyright 
holders with no feasible remedy.140  This Note argues that, while consistent 
with Boerne and Florida Prepaid, the case was wrongly decided because it 
extends a series of errant decisions that collectively have blown the Court off 
course from a constitutionally justifiable interpretation of the state sovereign 
immunity doctrine.141  
Section IV.A contends that the perennial ambiguity of the state 
sovereign immunity doctrine and its atextual modern interpretation 
undermine its application in the present case to categorically bar all copyright 
infringement suits against states.142  Section IV.B argues that the CRCA 
 
decided several years after the CRCA and PRCA were enacted.  Thus, Congress believed that it 
could pass those statutes in accordance with the just-decided opinion in Union Gas, and had no way 
of knowing that the statutes and legislative record would be scrutinized under the Boerne test.  Id.   
 133. Id. at 1008 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgement). 
 134. Id. at 1009 (“[R]ecognizing that my longstanding view has not carried the day, and that the 
Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid controls this case, I concur in the judgment.”).   
 135. Id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 136. Id. at 1007–08.  
 137. Id. at 1008. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 999 (majority opinion).  
 140. See infra Section IV.D. 
 141. See infra Section IV.A. 
 142. See infra Section IV.A. 
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should have been upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I authority 
to regulate intellectual property.143  Section IV.C raises a parallel argument 
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.144  Finally, Section IV.D suggests that 
the practical effect of Allen is to encourage state infringement and unfair 
market dominance—results which are openly at odds with the central tenets 
of the copyright system.145  
A. The Contentious History and Modern Atextual Interpretation of the 
State Sovereign Immunity Doctrine Undermine its Application to 
Bar Remedies for State Copyright Infringement 
The contorted logic underlying the contemporary interpretation of state 
sovereign immunity calls into question the precedential value of several 
recent cases.146  The doctrine is mentioned nowhere in the Constitution and 
has never been explicitly defined.147  It is more closely aligned with a 
monarchial political philosophy than a democratic one, and thus does not 
translate smoothly from English into American common law.148  
Over time, a narrow majority of the Court has adopted an increasingly 
broad interpretation of state sovereign immunity, resulting in an erosion of 
available remedies for state intrusions on federally guaranteed rights.149  As 
the doctrine now stands—at its most powerful point in history—these 
remedies are now exclusively limited to situations where Congress, acting 
pursuant to its authority to “appropriate[ly]” enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, enacts legislation with unequivocal language that is narrowly 
tailored to remedying due process violations.150  
 
 143. See infra Section IV.B.  
 144. See infra Section IV.C.  
 145. See infra Section IV.D.  
 146. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1988) (“[I]nstitutional values of stare decisis are ill-served by formal 
adherence to a doctrine riddled with exceptions designed to counterbalance its evils.”).  
 147. Id. at 4 (“The Eleventh Amendment, and the doctrine . . . which it represents, has long been 
perceived as a doctrinal abyss, replete with inconsistencies borne of pragmatic adjustments to the 
principle for which it supposedly stands.”).  
 148. In contrast with the English feudal system, political authority in a representative democracy 
like the United States derives principally from the people.  See Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 
525, 537 (E.D.N.C. 2017) (“The founders envisioned and wrote a Constitution founded upon the 
sovereignty of the people, not the states.”), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).  The doctrine’s invocation 
of the invincible state appears to be at odds with the idea of democratic sovereignty, where authority 
supposedly flows from, not to, the people.  Id.  
 149. Jackson, supra note 146, at 3 (“[Sovereign] immunity is in tension with [the principle] . . . 
that the law will generally provide a remedy for rights violated by the government . . . .”)  
 150. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). 
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The expansion of the doctrine to bar federal question suits and suits 
brought by in-state plaintiffs ignores the explicit language in the Eleventh 
Amendment, which only prohibits suits brought by out-of-state citizens.151  
This stands as an exception to a traditionally accepted canon of statutory 
construction.152  The text of the Amendment does not mention in-state 
plaintiffs at all.153  If the Amendment aimed to treat in-state and out-of-state 
plaintiffs equally, then there would have been no need to distinguish them.  
While the enacted Amendment only literally bars diversity suits, earlier drafts 
of the Amendment would have unconditionally barred suits against states in 
all cases.154  This implies that the Amendment was only intended to bar 
diversity suits.155  Furthermore, Chisholm—the impetus for the Amendment’s 
passage—was a model diversity case.156  Recognizing the Amendment’s 
specific exclusion of diversity suits, the Court in an early case affirmed that 
the Eleventh Amendment did not bar federal question suits.157  By straying 
from this interpretation, the Court has steered the state sovereign immunity 
doctrine away from its constitutional harbor into choppy and uncharted 
waters.158   
 
 151. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
 152. The interpretative canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the explicit mention of one 
[thing] is the exclusion of another”) suggests that that when a specific class of people is specified, 
an intention to exclude all others may be inferred.  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
 153. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 154. Michael Landau, State Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property Revisited, 22 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 513, 528 (2012) (“Congress rejected the first proposed 
version of the Eleventh Amendment, which provided in part that ‘no state shall be liable to be made 
a party defendant’ . . . which would have effectively barred both in-state and out-of-state citizen 
suits.”) (citation omitted). 
 155. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign 
Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 283, 292 (2003) (“The case for expresio 
unius is also stronger when the subject matter of the proposed implicit exception was within the 
contemplation of the drafters.”). 
 156. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 466 (1793) (“The grand and principal question in this 
case is, whether a State can . . . be sued by an individual citizen of another State?”).  Thus, if the 
passage of the Eleventh Amendment can be accurately characterized as a reaction to Chisholm, the 
legislature was reacting to a diversity case.  Id.  
 157. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 382 (1821). 
 158. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759–60 (1999) (expanding scope of sovereign immunity 
to prohibit suits against states in state court).  The departure of sovereign immunity jurisprudence 
from reliance on the text is best described as a rejection of the idea that the doctrine is limited in 
any way by the text of the Eleventh Amendment.  Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 
775, 779 (1991).  
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B. The Court Should Have Deferred to Congress’s Article I Authority 
to Regulate and Protect Copyrights 
The Court supported the idea that Congress may abrogate state 
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I authority until its 5–4 ruling in 
Seminole Tribe unexpectedly foreclosed that route.159  Given the Court’s 
subsequent retreat in Katz from that holding, and the fact that copyright 
infringement is exclusively in the federal domain, the Court erred in relying 
on Seminole Tribe as controlling authority and instead should have looked to 
the text of the Intellectual Property Clause.160 
1. The Overbroad Holding in Seminole Tribe Capriciously 
Forecloses Congress’s Authority to Abrogate State Sovereign 
Immunity Pursuant to Article I 
The Court in Seminole Tribe went astray when it boldly rejected all of 
Article I as a potential basis for abrogation.161  In overturning Union Gas, a 
majority of the Court abandoned the idea that the states had implicitly waived 
sovereign immunity by ratifying Article I.162  Strikingly, the holding 
extended to all of Article I, despite the fact that Article I encompasses a broad 
range of powers, including in areas like intellectual property, which are the 
exclusive province of the federal government.163  The practical result of 
Seminole Tribe is to preclude any possibility of grounding intellectual 
property abrogation statutes on the Intellectual Property Clause—as 
 
 159. See Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475 (1987) (“We 
assume . . . that the authority of Congress to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal court is 
not confined to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  Although Congress’s Article I powers are 
extensive, the Court did not categorically permit Article I powers to be used to abrogate sovereign 
immunity in all cases.  See Emps. of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & 
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1973) (“[W]e decline to extend Parden to cover every exercise by 
Congress of its commerce power . . . .”). 
 160. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 652 
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It was equally appropriate for Congress to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity in patent infringement cases in order to close a potential loophole in the uniform federal 
scheme, which, if undermined, would necessarily decrease the efficacy of the process afforded to 
patent holders.”). 
 161. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (“Article I cannot be used to 
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”). 
 162. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (“Congress’[s] authority to regulate 
commerce includes the authority directly to abrogate States’ immunity from suit.”), overruled by 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.  Furthermore, every federal circuit court to have faced this issue has 
decided in favor of abrogation.  Id. at 15. 
 163. Id.  
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Congress intended with the CRCA and PRCA—enabling the Allen Court to 
completely ignore the text and legislative history of the clause.164  
The holding of Seminole Tribe was undermined by the Court’s later 
allowance of an exception for bankruptcy suits in Katz.165  The Katz Court 
sidestepped a proper stare decisis analysis by simply claiming that the 
relevant language of Seminole Tribe, which stated, “Article I cannot be used 
to circumvent the constitutional limitation placed upon federal jurisdiction,” 
was dicta rather than a holding.166  But if the Bankruptcy Clause could be 
entertained and upheld as an exception automatically justifying abrogation, 
then why did the Allen Court not even consider the Intellectual Property 
Clause? 
2. The Intellectual Property Clause Deserves Recognition as 
Establishing a Fundamental Federal Power 
Unique among Article I powers, the Intellectual Property Clause 
empowers Congress to “secure[] … exclusive Right[s]” to copyright 
holders.167  This language implies that the Framers intended the copyright 
holder to be the sole lawful owner of the work.168  Like bankruptcy, 
intellectual property laws are federally uniform, with federal courts enjoying 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright suits.169  This uniformity is 
key for the system to function most effectively.170  Historically, the Court has 
 
 164. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 636 (“Seminole 
Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article 
I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or 
the Patent Clause.”). 
 165. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006).  
 166. Id. at 363 (“We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and the dissenting 
opinions in [Seminole Tribe] reflected an assumption that the holding in that case would apply to 
the Bankruptcy Clause. . . . Careful study and reflection have convinced us, however, that that 
assumption was erroneous.”). 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 168. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 267 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed., 1908) (“The utility of this 
power will scarcely be questioned. . . . The States cannot separately make effectual provision for 
either [copyrights or patents], and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws 
passed at the instance of Congress.”).  
 169. See Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (“The entire structure 
of the patent laws is meant to provide a national, uniform system to provide the most meaningful 
protection for the inventor.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety 
protection, copyrights and trademarks.  No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for 
relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.”). 
 170. J. Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 502, p. 402 (R. 
Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987) (“It is beneficial to all parties, that the national government should 
possess this power; to authors and inventors, because, otherwise, they would be subjected to the 
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held that states have implicitly waived immunity in areas that are federally 
preempted.171  That was precisely the basis for the Court’s decision in Katz, 
which abrogated state sovereign immunity from bankruptcy suits because 
Congress had clearly intended bankruptcy laws to be uniform.172  These facts, 
along with the plain text of the Intellectual Property Clause, provide strong 
evidence that states had implicitly waived sovereign immunity from 
intellectual property suits by ratifying the Constitution, as they had 
apparently done in bankruptcy suits.173  
C. The Court Should Have Deferred to Congress’s Authority to 
Enforce the Protections of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In addition to the strong support from Article I, the CRCA should also 
have been upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
powers.174  The CRCA is designed to remedy state infringement in a fair and 
uniform way that simultaneously respects the Framers’ intentions in 
establishing the copyright system, adheres to the actual text of the 
Constitution, and protects the rights of copyright holders.175   
In applying the Boerne test to intellectual property, the Court placed too 
much weight on the record of state infringement.176  Also, the Court erred in 
introducing an intent element to determine whether an infringing state had 
violated the Due Process Clause.177  This is inconsistent with copyright law, 
under which infringement is a strict liability offense.178   
 
varying laws and systems of the different states on this subject, which would impair, and might even 
destroy the value of their rights.”).  
 171. Landau, supra note 154, at 560.  
 172. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006). 
 173. Lemelson, 372 F. Supp. at 711 (“[I]n granting to Congress the right to create exclusive 
patents, the states largely surrendered their sovereignty over patents.”).  
 174. See Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 540 (E.D.N.C. 2017) (“Congress has clearly 
abrogated state immunity in cases arising under the CRCA, and such an abrogation is congruent and 
proportional to a clear pattern of abuse by the states.”), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).   
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (“[I]nfringement must be intentional, or at 
least reckless, to come within the reach of the Due Process Clause.”).  
 178. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.  Consider two similarly situated defendants in two copyright 
infringement suits: a state agency and a citizen.  Despite being sued under the very same law, courts 
would have to assess intent with regard to the agency—but not the citizen—in order to conduct a 
proper analysis.  
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1. The Court Overstated the Significance of the CRCA’s Record of 
State Infringement 
The Court’s requirement of a substantial record of past infringement as 
reflected in the CRCA’s legislative history presents several problems.  First, 
it stands at odds with the Court’s assurance that Congress may pass 
“prophylactic legislation.”179  Second, the most relevant timeframe for 
Congress to assess state infringement was the few years between the Court’s 
tightening of the “unequivocal language” requirement in 1985 and the 
passage of the CRCA, and it was unreasonable to expect Congress to find a 
record brimming with infringement in this short time.180  By limiting its 
assessment of state infringement to the 1988 Oman Report, the Court 
conveniently ignored every instance of infringement that has occurred 
since.181  There are several other reasons why the actual number of instances 
of infringement is likely much higher than documented in the legislative 
record.182  States were historically unprotected from infringement suits and 
thus naturally deterred from infringing, so the relative scarcity of litigation is 
hardly surprising.183  But in the wake of the Court’s decisions restricting 
Congress’s abrogatory authority, the fear (now fact) that states can simply 
assert immunity and win the case discourages aggrieved copyright holders 
from filing suit in the first place.184  After Allen, district courts must follow 
the decision of the Supreme Court and can no longer make an independent 
finding.185  This means that copyright holders simply cannot prevail against 
a state until Congress passes a new abrogation statute that is acceptable to the 
Court.186  Finally, the Copyright Office does not have the resources or 
 
 179. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000).  Ironically, the very same opinion 
in which the Court introduces a test that dramatically restricts permissible abrogations also claims 
to grant “much deference” to Congress in designing Fourteenth Amendment legislation.  City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] 
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and 
its conclusions are entitled to much deference.”) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). 
 180. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). 
 181. Brief for Ralph Oman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Allen v. Cooper, 140 
S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-
877/87373/20190207102951115_2019-02-07%20No%2018-
877%20Oman%20Amicus%20Br.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Ralph Oman].  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Marybeth Statement, supra note 97, at 14–15.  Even if sovereign immunity concerns do not 
preempt filing altogether, most disputes end with a settlement agreement rather than proceeding to 
trial.  Landau, supra note 154, at 553. 
 185. See generally Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565 
(2017) (explaining the history and contours of the rule that lower courts must follow binding 
precedent).   
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authority to assemble a comprehensive catalogue of state infringement.187  
The Oman Report solicited information by means of a news bulletin, and the 
study was by no means intended to be exhaustive, or even comprehensive.188   
Even if states do not begin systematically abusing copyrights, each 
infringement deserves a remedy.189  There should not be a magic number of 
violations of any type of conduct required to warrant a remedy.190  Under this 
purely reactionary framework, there would be no reason to outlaw murder, 
for example, if the murder rate was low.  Also, the problems are only going 
to get worse as intellectual property becomes increasingly important to state 
enterprises and business.191  Courts should not only look to the history of state 
conduct, but also consider the foreseeable future.192  
2. State Copyright Infringement is a “De Facto” Infringement of a 
Copyright Holder’s Due Process Rights 
The Court’s complaint that the CRCA’s record did not distinguish 
intentional and unintentional state violations is unwarranted because intent is 
not an essential element of a copyright infringement claim.193  Intent can, 
however, substantially affect the award of statutory damages.194  A state that 
only negligently infringes could be held liable for a lesser amount, and the 
same would be true if the parties’ positions were reversed.195  Thus, even with 
a broad abrogation, as intended by the CRCA, the law is flexible enough to 
 
 187. Brief for Ralph Oman, supra note 181, at 13. 
 188. Id. at 8–9.  
 189. Justice John Marshall famously decreed that for every violation of a legal right, there should 
be a corresponding remedy.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 190. Id.  
 191. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: 2016 Update, 1 
(2016), https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-motion/intellectual-property-and-us-
economy [https://perma.cc/GLB9-EPD5] (“IP-intensive industries continue to be a major, integral 
and growing part of the U.S. economy.”); see also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 657 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“States and their 
instrumentalities are heavily involved in the federal patent system.”).  
 192. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 654–55.   
 193. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner” will be held liable as an infringer).  Copyright infringement cases generally proceed 
predictably.  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (providing an 
overview of copyright infringement doctrine).  First, the court asks the plaintiff to demonstrate 
ownership of a valid copyright.  Id.  Second, the court looks for evidence that the defendant copied 
any original and protectable elements of that work.  Id.  
 194. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (stating that in cases where the infringement is unintentional, the 
minimum statutory damages award may be lowered from $750 to $200 but in cases where the 
infringement is willful, the maximum statutory damages award may be increased from $30,000 to 
$150,000).   
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account for intent and allocate damages accordingly.196  This flexibility 
enables the CRCA to treat states fairly and simultaneously hold them 
accountable for their actions.197   
Florida Prepaid held that a copyright owner’s due process rights are 
violated when an infringing state fails to offer an adequate remedy.198  But a 
damages award from a successful infringement suit is, in most cases, the only 
remedy that can adequately compensate the copyright owner.199  The state 
law causes of action that the Court suggested as alternatives are insufficient 
because they do not allow for the same degree of damages awards.200  A 
plaintiff asserting a copyright infringement claim may seek (1) an injunction 
to prevent further copying; (2) actual damages based on a calculation of lost 
profits; or (3) statutory damages if actual damages cannot easily be 
determined.201  Seeking an injunction is often not a viable strategy because 
by the time it is issued, the damage has already been done.202  An award of 
statutory damages, however, can net up to $150,000 per instance of 
infringement.203  Thus, striking down the CRCA and barring all infringement 
suits against states deprives aggrieved copyright holders of any meaningful 
recourse.   
D. Failure to Hold States Liable for Copyright Infringement Subverts 
the Fundamental Goals of the Copyright System to Promote and 
Protect Artistic Expression 
The copyright system enables artists to enrich the world with the fruits 
of their creative labors.204  The value of a copyright is derived from the 
exclusive rights vested in the owner; securing these rights is essential to a fair 
 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642–
44 (1999). 
 199. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lack of comparable remedies 
underscores the importance of the CRCA and PRCA).  
 200. Id. at 659.  Also, suits against states generally cannot be brought in state court either.  See 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759–60 (1999). 
 201. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433–34 (1984); 17 
U.S.C. § 504. 
 202. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877).  
Once copyrighted material has been widely shared on the Internet, for example, the copyright owner 
can never fully regain exclusive control.  Id.  Also, court costs and attorney’s fees cannot be 
recovered by a plaintiff seeking an injunction, while they can be recouped by a plaintiff seeking 
damages, making the latter a more appealing option.  Id. 
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
 204. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States 
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public 
from the labors of authors.”). 
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and properly functioning system.205  The system must delicately balance the 
rights of artists to control and profit from their works with the benefits gained 
by society.206  Allen squarely disrupts this balance by allowing states to 
exploit copyrighted works without permission.207  On average, people are less 
likely to create protectable works now that states can freely infringe.208   
Now, more than ever, states are deeply engaged in copyright-intensive 
enterprises such as education, publishing, research, and tourism.209  
Leveraging sovereign immunity in the intellectual property marketplace 
upsets the balance between states and private actors and disincentivizes 
creators from working with states.210  There are several recent examples—
that the Court either failed to capture or willfully ignored—of states 
successfully asserting sovereign immunity in order to claim ownership of 
works that were codeveloped with private entities.211  When states are able to 
extract “substantial concessions of basic rights under the Copyright Act” by 
simply citing Allen, it is clear that they can easily obtain a financial advantage 
and unfairly burden copyright owners.212  The Supreme Court has in the past 
cautioned states that when they act like a business, they will be treated like 
 
 205. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106.  
 206. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (specifying that “the “fair use” of a copyrighted work . . . for “purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.”).  
 207. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 652 
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 208. Id.  
 209. In the past forty years, over 32,000 copyright registrations have been assigned to state 
universities.  Marybeth Statement, supra note 97, at 18.   
 210. Oman Report, supra note 100, at 15–16.  
 211. See Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. St. Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088 
(S.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing copyright infringement suit regarding state university’s alleged 
plagiarism of private report); InfoMath, Inc. v. Univ. of Ark., 633 F. Supp. 2d 674 (E.D. Ark. 2007) 
(dismissing copyright infringement suit regarding state university’s unauthorized use of privately-
owned course content); Jacobs v. Memphis Convention & Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663 
(W.D. Tenn. 2010) (dismissing copyright infringement suit regarding state tourist agency’s 
unauthorized use of copyrighted images); Xechem Int’l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson 
Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (dismissing patent infringement suit regarding 
codeveloped cancer drug). 
 212. Oman Report, supra note 100, at 11 (“Schools expect permission to create literally 
thousands of copies of translations or thousands of audio cassettes or derivative works and they 
expect publishers to grant these permissions at no charge.”); see also Marybeth Statement, supra 
note 97, at 14–15.  
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one.213  But the expansion of sovereign immunity to allow states to infringe 
with impunity flouts this principle.214 
One potential solution to the problem Allen creates is for Congress to 
“play hardball” with the states by conditioning federal funding on a state’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity from intellectual property suits.215  Congress 
already has a history of successfully employing similar tactics to further other 
policy objectives, such as raising the drinking age.216  A conditional waiver 
of immunity may be a practical solution if addressing state infringement is 
found to be reasonably related to a specific area of federal funding.217    
Congress’s clearest path forward, however, as suggested by the Court, 
is to try again to craft an abrogation statute that satisfies the Boerne test by 
relying on an updated catalogue of infringement.218  This new statute could 
distinguish intentional and unintentional state conduct in order to paint a 
clearer picture of the ongoing problems.219  The urgency of the situation has 
prompted a rapid response: a study is already underway between Congress 
and the Patent and Copyright Offices to define the contours of this 
prospective law.220  The first phase of the study involved a comment 
solicitation period from the Copyright Office directed towards aggrieved 
copyright holders and other interested stakeholders.221  The goal of the public 
comment period, as evidenced by the questionnaire, was to create a catalogue 
 
 213. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (“[W]hen a 
state . . . enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation 
as fully as if it were a private person or corporation.”).  
 214. Noticeably, the federal government has agreed to play by the rules, promising money 
damages in federal court when it violates the exclusive rights of a citizen copyright owner.  28 
U.S.C. § 1498(b) (“[W]henever the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the 
United States shall be infringed by the United States . . . the exclusive action which may be brought 
for such infringement shall be an action by the copyright owner against the United States in the 
Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as damages for 
such infringement . . . .”). 
 215. Landau, supra note 154, at 561.  
 216. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1983) (holding that Congress may condition 
a state’s receipt of federal highway funds on the state agreeing to raise the drinking age to twenty-
one).  The condition was upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power because it was 
“reasonably calculated” to address the public welfare concern of drunk driving.  Id. at 209.  
 217. Landau, supra note 154, at 562 (arguing that such a condition would “certain[ly]” be 
upheld).  
 218. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020) (“[The decision] need not prevent Congress 
from passing a valid abrogation law in the future.”).  
 219. Id.  
 220. Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,252 
(June 3, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/03/2020-12019/sovereign-
immunity-study-notice-and-request-for-public-comment.  
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of state infringement that satisfies the constraints of the Boerne test.222  The 
comment period was extended twice, from two months to four.223  On 
November 5, 2020, the Patent and Trademark Office launched its own 
parallel request for information to measure recent trends in state patent and 
trademark infringement.224  
On December 11, 2020, the Copyright Office held a roundtable 
discussion over Zoom, inviting stakeholders from all over the country to 
voice their concerns in the wake of Allen.225  The discussions centered around 
three major topics: (1) evidence of state infringement; (2) state policies or 
practices regarding infringement; and (3) whether alternative remedies could 
be considered adequate.226  The anecdotal testimony and survey results 
presented therein will surely provide useful guidance as Congress considers 
the next steps.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that the CRCA was an 
unconstitutional attempt by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
from copyright infringement suits, as it was not sufficiently tailored to 
remedy violations of a constitutional magnitude and failed to show a 
conclusive pattern of state misconduct.227  This holding, which effectively 
bars all remedies when a state infringes, does not comport with either the 
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plain text of the Constitution or the public policy goals of the copyright 
system.228  Although both Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment grant 
Congress wide latitude to protect intellectual property,229 artists and inventors 
are now more vulnerable than ever to state exploitation in the wake of this 
short-sighted decision.230  The silver lining is that abrogating sovereign 
immunity from copyright suits need not require the reversal of any Supreme 
Court precedent as long as Congress moves forward with creating an 
enhanced catalogue of state infringement, which it appears to be doing.231  
These recent developments inspire hope that the copyright protections 
intended by the Framers will soon be restored, enabling smooth sailing once 
again in the copyright seas.  
 
 228. See supra Section IV.A 
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